A RECONCEPTUALISATION OF THE SELF IN HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY: HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT AND THE SOCIOCULTURAL TURN

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Abstract
Since the early 1970s, humanistic psychology has struggled to remain a relevant force in the social and psychological science. we attribute this in part to a conceptualisation of the self, rooted in theoretically outmoded thinking. In response to the issue of relevancy a sociocultural turn has been called for within humanistic psychology, which draws directly and indirectly on the conceptual insights of Michel Foucault. However, this growing body of research lacks a unifying conceptual base that is able to encompass its new perspectives (its call for a sociocultural turn) and the movement's theoretical antecedents (the actualising tendency). This analysis suggests a way forward by offering a potential reconceptualisation of the self in humanistic psychology through the existential-phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. We argue that Heidegger's conception of the self takes account of subjectivities produced in discourse and institutional practice, while acknowledging the human capacity for actualisation in his concept of the authentic-self.

Keywords: Humanistic psychology, Actualising tendency, Sociocultural turn, Dasein, authentic-self.

Introduction

In surveying the effect of postmodernism on humanistic psychology's conception of the self, Kenneth Gergen (1995) and Donald Polkinghorne (2001) argue that its basic assumption, the actualising tendency, has been undermined by the **theorization** of a decentred subject. In light of this challenge Gergen and Polkinghorne argue the self in humanistic psychology requires a reconceptualisation to take account of these alternative philosophies. Similarly, a number of humanistic psychologists have called for a sociocultural turn. Its implications for the self in humanistic psychology are a move away from an autonomous and discretely separated self, to a self constituted by its social and cultural conditions.

The call for a sociocultural turn represents an important theme that now runs through humanistic psychological research, borne out in part of dissatisfaction with earlier conceptualisations of the self. Work on this topic has been published in all of the major humanistic psychology publications--The Humanistic Psychologist, journal of Humanistic Psychology anti The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology. They include O'Hara (1992) and Arons' (1999) call for humanistic psychology to put a 'relational-self' at its centre, Malone's (1995) Lacanian challenge

to the humanistic psychological self, Baumgardner and Rappoport's (1996) and Montuori and Fahim's (2004) call for humanistic psychology to take account of the decentralised, flexible, and pluralistic self that has emerged in contemporary Western society and culture.

The problem with this particular body of work is that it lacks a unifying conceptual base that is able to encompass its new perspectives (the call for a sociocultural turn) and the movement's theoretical antecedents (the actualising tendency). Many of the concepts raised by those advocating for a sociocultural turn in humanistic psychology (e.g. Arons, 1999; Baumgardner & Rappoport, 1996; Gergen, 1995; Malone, 1995; Montuori & Fahim, 2004; O'Hara, 1992; Polkinghorne, 2001) draw directly and indirectly from the conceptual insights of Michel Foucault. It is therefore argued that a reconceptrualisation of the self in humanistic psychology, one that accedes to the wishes of those calling for asociocultural turn, needs to take account of Foucault's related conceptual insights. However, this move toward a sociocultural reconceptualisation of the self need not obscure or consign to history the spirit of an earlier conceptualisation of the self developed by the founders of humanistic psychology. This earlier conceptualisation of the self; most often associated with the work of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, assumes the self has a tendency to actualise its full potential. We argue that by returning to its roots in existential-phenomenology, in particular the work of Martin Heidegger, it is possible to reconcile the call fora sociocultural turn and the movement's earlier theory of the self. In this regard Heidegger's conception of the self takes account of subjectivities produced in discourse and institutional practice (the sociocultural turn), while acknowledging the human capacity for actualisation (the actualising tendency) in his concept of the authentic-self

We argue that invoking the philosophies of Foucault and Heidegger (1) in this manner would enable humanistic psychology to engage once again in contemporary debates in the social and psychological sciences. It would also enable humanistic psychology to better inoculate itself against its various detractors. For example, recent critics belonging to the new positive psychology movement (e.g. Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman, 2003) have sought to rekindle the stereotype that humanistic psychology promotes self-centredness and narcissism.

Despite its struggle to proclaim its relevance humanistic psychology has much to support its ongoing existence, primarily because it is one of the few alternative voices in the science of psychology (along with phenomenological psychology, critical psychology, community psychology, cultural psychology, and discursive psychology). Unlike mainstream psychology, humanistic psychology is more open, inclusive, and progressive. It pioneered the movement away from psychology's preoccupation with illness and pathology (e.g. Maslow, 1954) and it has shown a willingness to debate public policy, to engage in social criticism, and to take social action on issues it deems important (e.g. Brown & Mazza, 1996; Diaz-Laplante, 2007; Howard, 1992; Lyons, 2001; Prilleltensky, 1996). A good case in point has been its preparedness to critique institutional psychiatry and to provide a voice for the psychiatric survivor movement (e.g. Adame & Knudson, 2008; Bassman, 2001; Honos-Webb & Leitner, 2001). Its distinctiveness within the science of psychology can be seen in its willingness to take a self-reflexive approach to its underpinning theoretical assumptions and practices (Cosgrove, 2007; Geller, 1982; Giorgi, 1987,

1992, 2005; Neher, 1991; O'Hara, 2001; Shaw & Colimore, 1988). This stands in stark contrast to mainstream forms of psychology, which appear to demonstrate an unwillingness to question their natural science epistemology and their willingness to accept the social and cultural status quo which has been shown to play a significant role in perpetuating psychological distress and disorder (Fox, Prilleltensky & Austin, 2009). Lastly, humanistic psychology pioneered the use of and continues to refine progressive approaches to theory, method, and practice in psychology (e.g. existentialism, phenomenology, human science, transpersonal, and postmodern). (2) That it continues to pursue this progressive mission has unfortunately led to its marginalisation (Churchill, 1997) and an impoverished stereotyping by mainstream psychological scientists (Elkins, 2009; Wertz, 1998).

Therefore, with this agenda we invoke the philosophies of Foucault and Heidegger in providing a reconceptualisation of the self. Before we do this, however we will briefly touch on Foucault and Heidegger's respective links with humanistic psychology. Links between humanistic psychology and Heidegger's existential-phenomenology are well known and acknowledged by humanistic psychologists (e.g. Moss, 2001, pp. 11-12). A closer alignment with Heidegger's philosophy is, in many respects, a return to humanistic psychology's existential-phenomenological roots.

Links between humanistic psychology and the philosophy of Foucault are much less clear, but no less important. These two strands of knowledge share a number of important commonalities. In the 1950s and 60s both humanistic psychology and Foucault offered an alternative view of psychiatry and psychology by emphasising the subjective experience of psychological distress. (3) Both challenged the dominant psychoanalytic (psychiatry) and behaviouristic (psychology) conceptions of the time and their philosophical basis in a causal deterministic paradigm (e.g. Foucault, 1954,1986; Maslow,1954, 1968). Although pure behaviourism has now been consigned to psychology's history books, it continues to exert a significant influence on psychology's largely positivist experimental approach to science. A good example of this has been positive psychology's (a representative of mainstream psychology) critique of humanistic psychology's use of phenomenological research methods (e.g. Peterson & Seligman, 2004 p. 4; Seligman, 2003, p. 275; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 7). As Seligman (2003, p. 275) argues, humanistic psychology is based on a "sloppier, radical epistemology stressing phenomenology and individual case histories".

Humanistic psychology, like Foucauldian philosophy, subscribes to the Continental philosophical raison d'etre which, broadly speaking, attempts to awaken a critical consciousness in the Present as a response to the alienation that has become characteristic of modernity (Critchley, 1998, pp. 11-13). Lastly, humanistic psychology and Foucauldian philosophy have been instrumental in critiquing psychiatry anti treatment and classification of mental distress (Cooper, 1967; Foucault, 1961; Laing, 1960; Maslow, 1954; Szasz, 1961). During the 1950s and 60s humanistic psychology and Foucauldian philosophy sought to inject fresh insights into the study of mental distress by emphasising its subjective experience and exposing the objectification and dehumamsing practices of institutional psychiatry and clinical psychology.

In the following analysis the assumptions underpinning the self in humanistic psychology are reviewed. This begins with a focus on the founders, Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. This is followed by a review and outline of the self, conceptualised in the philosophies of Foucault and Heidegger. From here, the discussion moves on to chart how Heidegger's existential-phenomenology simultaneously incorporates a constitution of the sell within its sociocultural context while acknowledging the capacity for actualisation in his theory of the authentic-self.

The Self in Humanistic Psychology

Humanistic psychology emerged in the United States in the late 1940s and early 50s by drawing on a range of theoretical antecedents (Moss, 2001). The most significant of these was existential philosophy. "Existential philosophy can supply psychology with an underpinning philosophy and a counter to the determinism of behaviourism and psychoanalysis" (Maslow, 1968, pp. 10-11). Part of the vision that humanistic psychology proposed was the re-introduction of the self into psychological research (Polkinghorne, 2001, p. 82), guided by die existential-phenomenological theory of 'intentionality' (Moss, 2001, pp. 11-12).

The self was at the heart of Maslow's (1954) conception of the actualising tendency (or growth hypothesis), which is based on the assumption that the self has a natural tendency toward actualisation. Maslow's conception of the self was understood not as mind in the Cartesian sense of a mental or material substance whose function is to serve as a person's executive. Instead, "the essence of the self is a tendency to grow to fullness, and it is the essential characteristic of humans" (Polkinghorne, 2001, p. 82). Maslow and Rogers made a distinction between the actual-selfand self-concept. Self-concept is a person's understanding or perception of who or what they are, which is informed by conceptual schemes imposed by society and enforced by significant others.

These schemes often can lead people to understand their selves as static and unchangeable things that do riot measure up to social expectations; they appear as being stuck in their present conditions without possibilities. (Polkinghorne, 2001, p. 83).

In contrast, the actual-self is the self uncontaminated by social and other expectations. It is a conscious realisation that one has the power to change, to move forward in life, and to make choices that express one's authentic values (Polkinghorne, 2001, p. 84). It is a movement away from facades and meeting the expectations of others, towards a greater openness to experience, autonomy, self-direction, and acceptance of what is as opposed to what ought to be (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1961).

Carl Rogers, like Maslow, was a pioneer of the humanistic psychology movement. His conception of the self emerged in his case observations as a psychotherapist (Rogers, 1961, pp. 167-182). Rogers emphasised the personality's innate drive toward achieving its full potential: "the organism has one basic tendency and striving--to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism" (Rogers, 1951, p. 487). In striving toward this, end people naturally seek to become more authentic, to form and express their own values and beliefs (Rogers, 1961). In his clinical observations, Rogers (1951) found his clients investing a great deal of time and energy wearing various masks, that is playing at socially ascribed roles in order to gain acceptance, love,

and respect from those around them. It was through these observations that Rogers (1951) developed a new approach to psychotherapy he termed client-centred. The aim of client-centred therapy is to allow the client to explore hidden or concealed elements of the self (values, beliefs, attitudes, interests, passions, and talents), to enhance self-regard, openness to experience and emotions, which are thought to result in greater autonomy and mastery of life (Raskin & Rogers, 2005). If the self is to grow and actualise its potential, it requires an enabling environment providing it with support and nurturance for the individual's inborn psychological needs (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1961).

One of the most commonly cited criticisms of Rogers' and Maslow's conception of the self is that it falls into the trap of essentialism by reducing it to a handful of biological traits determined at birth, whose potential is then subsequently actualised over the life-span (Geller, 1982; Neher, 1991). In this line of argument the humanistic psychological self is reduced to a universally determined set of dispositions, not unlike mainstream theories of personality. What is missing, Neher (1991, p. 94) argues, is an acknowledgement of the socialisation process into the norms of a particular culture: "our genetic heritage seems to consist, to a large degree, of a potential to adapt to any of the wide variety of cultures that have ever existed; that is, our genetic endowment seems very flexible in this regard." Reaching one's potential requires getting in touch with a deeper inner self uncontaminated by social roles and expectations. The true self exists prior to and independent of its context, "the human self is what it is, we are what we are, independent of the environment" (Geller, 1982, p. 65).

Another major criticism of humanistic psychology is that it supports the modern Western emphasis on rationality (Cosgrove, 2007). This ties in with other similar critiques that link the actualising tendency with political expediency. A number of authors (e.g. Brinkmann, 2008; Carrette, 2003; Cushman, 1995; Malone, 2007; Shaw & Colimore, 1988) argue that humanistic psychology was a particular product of the growing optimism that characterised U.S. society in the years following the Second World War, and that it came to reflect the dominant political and economic ideologies of the time. According to Warmouth (1998) this stemmed from humanistic psychology's alternative conception of the self, stimulated by a middle class response to widespread feelings of alienation that became characteristic of late industrial society. Humanistic psychology emerged as one of a number of technologies supporting the viability of capitalist states and their consumer cultures. It mobilised human resources by calling for the uncovering of productive values, talents, and skills (Malone, 2007). The idea of the actualising tendency allows the individual to maintain an illusion of self-hood, agency, and freedom, while ensuring efficient, rational, enterprising, and productive members of society (Buss, 1979; Carrette, 2003; Malone, 2007; Shaw & Colimore, 1988).

The Subject in Michel Foucault's Philosophy

Foucault's (1983, p. 212) concept of the subject is composed of two basic dimensions: (1) the subject of power, knowledge, and discourse influenced by governmental systems and their institutional practices, and (2) the subject tied to an identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.

Foucault (1983) tended to favour the term 'subject' over the self because of his primary interest in the different historical modes by which human beings have been constituted as subjects. In his various historical analyses, Foucault critiqued the development of Western systems of political economy, which claimed to enhance individual liberties, reason, and rationality by exposing the links between power, knowledge, ideology, and discourse. He illustrated this in his investigations of the historical development of modern institutions such as hospitals, psychiatry, medicine, the social sciences, prisons, sexuality, schools, and the armed forces; all of which exercise control, discipline, and surveillance over their populations (Foucault, 1975). However, Foucault (1984, p. 45) was not an anti-enlightenment, anti-modernist thinker as many of his critics have claimed. Indeed he acknowledged the significance of Immanuel Kant (the enlightenment/modernist philosopher) and his contribution to the development of modern science and its basis in critical inquiry.

By analysing elements of subjectification at various historical epochs, Foucault was able to trace its residual influence in modernity, a process he termed a "history of the present" (Foucault, 1975, p. 31). In doing so, Foucault sought to effect greater freedom through the uncovering of historical discourses and ideologies that have come to constrain a freely forming subjectivity in the modern era. It was through the analyses that Foucault linked power inextricably with knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 203). Foucault (1977) notes:

> Power and knowledge directly imply one another; there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.

Power/knowledge is immanent in all social relations and interactions. The individual comes to know themselves by acquiring social knowledge, which is influenced by the dominant ethical and moral codes of a particular culture, communicated in discourse and exercised in modern society through dominant institutions (e.g. schools, universities, politics, business, government bureaucracies, the mass media etc.). Power/knowledge relations are a product of specific rationalities tied to truth claims, which are communicated in statements and discourse (Foucault, 1969/2002, 1975). Discourse according to Foucault refers not only to language and social interaction but also to relatively well-bounded areas of knowledge (e.g. medicine, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, etc.) which set the framework for thinking and talking about subjects (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 31). They are sets of rules and conditions established between institutions, economic and social practices, and patterns of behaviour (Foucault, 1981, p. 94). Power/knowledge is applied as a specific kind of social relation. It exists through agents' actions "only to the extent that other agents' actions remain appropriately aligned with them" (Rouse, 2003, p. 111). It is exercised rather than possessed, it is productive as well as repressive, and it arises from the bottom up (Olssen, 1999, p. 18).

Power/knowledge relations can be traced through various discourses illustrating the extent to which the subject (the self) is socially imposed. Foucault (1975) illustrated this process (whereby the subject is made into an object) using Jeremy Bentham's panopticon (meaning all seeing), this is an eighteenth century model prison he helped design. The panopticon is composed

of a tower at the centre of a hollow circular structure housing individual cells. The circular tower is arranged in order to enable constant observation without the awareness of the incarcerated prisoner, who through design, is never aware of the level of surveillance they are under. Foucault used the panopticon metaphorically to illustrate the individual's on subjection in modern society, as they watch themselves from the position of the observer through the process of internalising the eye of society (Olssen, 1999, pp. 31-32). It is through this internalisation process that the individual constructs a self. Technologies of the self--the term Foucault (1988a) used to refer to this process--are self-authoring practices informed by power/knowledge relations linked to concepts of Western rationality (Lemke, awn; Rose, 1996).

> technologies of the sell permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies, souls, thoughts, conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault, 1988a, p.18)

Foucault's conception of the subject is sharply contrasted with Maslow and Rogers' conceptualisation of the self, which they treat as an apolitical entity possessed with the potential to transcend the constraining bounds of social institutions, discourses, and power. A critique of the actualising tendency from a Foucauldian perspective would likely argue that it is a technology of the self allied to particular educative, therapeutic, and training procedures (Patton,1998, p. 545). These procedures are tied to capitalist political and economic discourses that produce subjects with the requisite insight and abilities to actualise related talents, skills, interests, and values (e.g. Lemke, 2001).

Foucault never directly critiqued Maslow or Rogers work during his life-time, therefore we can only speculate as what his views would have been. However Foucault, in the latter part of his career, sought to develop a transcendent re-evaluation of the person; a re-evaluation that has much in common with Maslow and Rogers' concept of the self. This change in direction marked Foucault's transition from studying systems of 'power relations', to studying the creation of 'ethical agency' (Blasius, 1993, p. 198). Foucault acknowledged the subject's greatly diminished agency within his conceptual framework, which he responded to with a reconceptualised subject with the capacity to realise the limits that discourse and power/knowledge exert (Hofmeyr, 2006, p. 218). What Foucault proposed was a reflexive-self committed to testing the limits of established regimes of thought, devoted to the creation of new possibilities, and where the emphasis would be on thinking that went beyond the basis of general principles or programmes of oppression (Huijer, 1999, p. 75). This would loosen the hold of power/knowledge relations in order to help free ourselves from understanding ourselves as subjects" (Dreyfus, 1996, p. 3; see also Thompson, 2003). A key aspect of this practice (and virtue) was critique:

> Critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought that the practices that we accept rest ... In fact I think the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism.

The practice of critique enables the unreflexive subject to reactivate their creative powers which Foucault referred to as an aesthetics of existence. An aesthetic of existence is an ethic for fashioning new kinds of subjectivities, working under the principle of autonomy, where new ways of looking at the world are crafted and practiced, and where style and artistry is applied to one's strengths and weaknesses (Huijer, 1999).

> What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become something related only to objects and not individuals or to life. That art is something which is specialized or done by experts who are artists. But why couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life? (Foucault, 1997 p. 261)

In concluding, Foucault's conception of the subject takes account of those elements of the self-produced in discourse and institutional practice. Mapping these insights onto the humanistic psychological self through Heidegger's philosophy would take account of its call for a sociocultural turn as well as accounting for alternative postmodern philosophies (e.g. Arons, 1999; Baumgardner & Rappoport, 1996; Gergen, 1995; Malone, 1995; Montuori & Fahim, 2004; O'Hara, 1992; Polkinghorne, 2001), while continuing to encompass the movement's traditional and ongoing commitment to critiquing mainstream psychological theory, methods, and practice in the following sections humanistic psychology's actualising tendency and Foucault's various insights into the subjective dimensions of the self, and his aesthetics of existence, are reconciled in Heidegger's concept of the authentic-self: However, before presenting this synthesis we need to briefly outline Heidegger's concept of the self.

Dasein in Martin Heidegger's Philosophy

Heideggerre-orientated the modernist conception of the self by the traditional separation between a unitary bounded self and its world. In its place, he proposed a temporal, process-orientated being, embedded in a cultural and discursive context where the individual, the Other, and world are co-constituted as an interdependent reality (Condrau, 1988, p. 106; van Deurzen, 1996, p. 56). Heidegger viewed the self as a human construction, proposing that there is only Being-in-the-world. He used the German term Dustin to articulate his concept of being, which is defined as Da meaning (t)here) is connected with sein (to be)--literally translated it means being (t)here. In colloquial German it means to be present or be there, and is applied to people rather than inanimate objects.

Intentionality is central to Heidegger's conception of Dasein. Consciousness is always intentional, in that it is never devoid of an object; there is no existence devoid of a world (Guignon, 2004, p. 123). Consciousness does not exist outside itself; it comes into existence through its context. In the absence of context, without a world, consciousness would cease to exist because it is inextricably related to its world. Heidegger referred to this self-world unity as Being-in-the-world to emphasise the fundamental relationship between Being and the physical-temporal space it occupies (Guignon, 2004, p. 120).

Being-in-the-world means that Dasein is constantly appropriating objects and tools without being aware of them as separate entities (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 102-107). Heidegger

(1927/1962, pp. 80-81) makes a distinction here between what he termed the ready-to-hand--objects that serve a practical purpose, are utilitarian, instrumental, and understood within a network-and the presence-at-hand, which are encountered in a mode of detached contemplation or observation (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 100).

Dasein lives in a concrete world, a world it tries to control and manipulate because it is in fundamental relationship with it, its ready-to-hand and presence-at-hand entities, and its Being-with-Others (or Being-with) (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 118-119). In the fusion of consciousness, Other, and world, Dasein creates and understands itself through its historical, discursive and cultural relations (Heidegger, 1988).

> Thus in characterizing the encountering of Others, one is again still by that Dasein which is in each case one's own ... By ‘Others' we do not mean everyone else but me--those over and against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part one does not distinguish oneself--those among whom one is too ... Being--with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factually no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. (Heidegger, 1927-1962, pp. 118-119)

In the above quote, Heidegger proposes there is no human essence because "Dasein's 'Essence' is grounded in its existence" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p.117). The ontological apriori status of Dasein's existence means that it must make a resolute commitment to something that gives its life a defining context; it is required to take a stand on its situation (Guignon, 2004, p. 120). Taken together, Heidegger conceives of the self as a reflexive, interactive, and ongoing process of becoming, fundamentally enmeshed in a shared life-world (Being-in-the-world) (Heidegger, 1988, p. 92). He dismisses notions of human nature, preferring instead to conditions of humanness, which are not composed of essences but are instead grounded in existence. This non-determinative worldview means that each individual has the capacity to define their own self through choice and the totality of one's actions.

Humanistic Psychology, Foucault, and Heidegger's Authentic-Self

In seeking to simultaneously invoke the philosophies of Foucault and Heidegger it is acknowledged from the outset that important ontological differences exist between their respective philosophies (Dreyfus, 2003; McWhorter, 2003). However, it has been shown previously that Heidegger's existential-phenomenology and Foucault's sociocultural analysis can be successfully used in combination to achieve insights into psychological life (Wertz, 2003). So that despite the philosophical differences between the two philosophers, we argue that Heidegger's existential-phenomenology gives expression to the subjected dimensions of the self--those high-lighted by Foucault--while simultaneously upholding the capacity of the self to experience modes of authenticity and actualisation as envisioned by the founders of humanistic psychology.

Dasein is embedded in a discursive context; it constructs and interprets self and world through discourse, by which it is constrained (Guignon, 2006, pp. 286-288; Heidegger, 1947/1993, p. 239). "A true understanding of Being will involve the recognition of constraints; Dasein operates with perspectives from which it is not possible to completely extricate itself" (Mirvish, 1999, p.

128). The self however is not entirely determined by the conditions of its existence such as discourse and institutional practice in the Foucauldian sense; for it is a self-making self-constituting being, it has the capacity for choice within limitations (Heidegger, 19274962, p. 192). Dasein therefore has the capacity to negotiate the alienating characteristics of modern discourse and institutions; a sentiment echoed in Maslow's (1954) theory of sell-actualisation. The difference however between Maslow and Rogers' view of authenticity compared to Heidegger's is illustrated in the following quote from Guignon (2004):

> It is important to keep in mind that authenticity has nothing to do with such romantic ideals as getting in touch with a deeper innerself or rising above the herd ... Indeed, since our own life stories are inseparable from the wider text of the shared we-world,authenticity can be nothing other than a fuller and richer form of participation in the public context. (p. 125)

Maslow and Rogers conceived of authenticity as the uncovering of latent inner potentials (elements of self) that modern life and its institutions distort, so that aspects of the actual-self are typically distorted or hidden from view. Authenticity is a transcendence of the ego and one's culture by becoming more detached from society. The authentic person "becomes a little more a member of his species and a little less a member of his local group" (Maslow, 1968, p. 12). The idea of transcending social and cultural forces runs counter to Foucault and Heidegger's philosophies, however Maslow does acknowledge these forces when he speaks of both "human aspirations" and "human limitations" (Maslow, 1968, p. 10). For Maslow such limitations are based on internal (genetic) givens, as opposed to external subjectifications. Heidegger, following a different line of thinking, conceived of authenticity as an engagement with public life--a direct negotiation with its unavoidable alienation within the bounds of what is existentially possible.

Maslow and Rogers' self has a natural or inherent propensity for transcendence (Polkinghorne, zoos), whereas Foucault and Heidegger discipline the self to history and discourse (McWhorter, 2003). As Dreyfus (1996, p. 3) notes: "For Foucault, power, like Heidegger's being ... is incarnated in historical social practices". Nevertheless, Heidegger and Foucault do not disregard the potential for transcendence within the limits of existence and discourse. Historicising the self acknowledges that it changes over time and in accordance with social, cultural, political, and economic conditions. In contemporary Western society the social, cultural, political, and economic conditions promote a rational, enterprising, competitive, productive, and narcissistic self (Lasch, 1979; Lemke, 2001, pp. 101-102; Rose, 1996, pp. 150-168). Yet despite Foucault's exposure of modern modes of subjectification, he is essentially a Nietzschean, arguing that power/knowledge is ultimately unstable and changeable (McWhorter, 2003, p. 122). "To say that one can never be outside power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matter what" (Foucault, 1981, p. 141 cited in McWhorter, 2003, p. 123).

To effect a transcendence that accounts for the historical, social, and cultural conditions that Foucault's analysis uncovers, is outlined in Heidegger's concept of the authentic-self Being-in-the-world makes alienation unavoidable and its pervasive systems of power/knowledge and their mobilisation in discourse. This creates a tension "often expressed in terms of a dialectic between the self and some aspect of its situation, most often a social one" (Tyman, 1999, p. 375).

This dialectic has the potential to stimulate change and transformation through a dialogue between inauthentic (everydayness) and authentic modes of existence (Ciaffa, 1987; Mills, 1997). As Heidegger (1927/1962, p. 179) notes "authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon". It is in the realisation of falling everydayness that Dasein understands its own potential for transcendence.

Inauthenticity is a mode of existence characterised by defences and barriers that seek to protect and immure the self from the conditions of existence--death, freedom, responsibility, choice, anxiety, and alienation. Inauthenticity is most powerfully called into consciousness when one is unavoidably brought face to face with these conditions. It is speculated that Foucault would add governmentality, power/knowledge, and discourse to these fundamental conditions of existence. In order to negotiate alienation, both Foucault and Heidegger emphasise thinking and practice that enables a movement beyond established regimes of thought and everydayness, where society's repressive and productive tendencies, and hidden power/knowledge relations are illuminated.

In balancing both the subjective and actualising elements of the self; Heidegger locates the authentic-self somewhere between the individual and their world (Zimmerman, 1981). Authentic Dasein engages with public life (everydayness), while critically reflecting on it. This critique forms part of the basis from which the authentic-self is created, so that it becomes a task or vocation that one Pursues (Condrau, 1988, p. 106; Guignon, 2002, p. 96; Guignon, 2004, p. 125). Guignon (2006) notes:

> Dasein achieves self-focusing by articulating its, existence in terms of the guidelines laid out by certain paradigmatic stories circulating in our cultural world ... Such paradigmatic stories generally show how strengths and weaknesses, assets and liabilitiescan be integrated into a coherent, meaningful life that succeeds incontributing something to the world. (pp. 287-288)

By taking a self-reflexive stance the individual places themselves in a position to locate an "existential power that mobilises the self's ability to change and become (Tyman, 1999, p. 375). This is not a self-originating power, as Dasein is always in relationship with its world; power is always a relational phenomenon. Authenticity can never be a departure from public life; it is a process of ongoing individuation and relatedness that allows one to freely express oneself in the social milieu. Its fluidity is akin to a verb-like happening or event that develops along the temporal arc of existence (Guignon, 2004, p. 120; Heidegger, 1988, p. 96). Guignon (1998) notes again:

> The fact that my life presents itself as a relatively coherentstory connecting past accomplishments and projections into the future is what first makes it possible for me to experience, and to attribute to myself, something like personal identity. (p. 568).

Conclusion

According to Philip Cushman (1995, p. 242) humanistic psychology's initial conception of an autonomous discretely separated self characterised by a set of actualising tendencies stemmed from the time lag between the beginnings of humanistic psychology in the late 1940s and the translation of texts attacking apolitical existentialism, which did not appear in English until the 1970s (e.g. Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason and Heidegger's Basic Problems in Phenomenology). This created the problem in that the thunders of humanistic psychology were informed by a European existential-phenomenology that was largely apolitical. Cushman's argument here goes someway toward explaining Maslow and Rogers' particular application of existential-phenomenology to psychology, which diverges in a number of important respects from Heidegger's philosophy (as well as other major existential-phenomenological philosophers). It supports our contention that humanistic psychology's resuscitation could be achieved by it returning to its European existential-phenomenological roots. A reconceptualisation of the self in line with Heidegger's philosophy could function as a meta-theme as part of a move toward a critical humanistic psychology.

In the reconceptualisation we offer, the humanistic psychological self would be constituted by its historical, social, cultural, political, and economic context. Humanistic psychology would heed the call for a sociocultural turn; however, it would be distinctly existential-phenomenological in its approach. For example, our reconceptualised self would emphasise alienation as a key feature of everyday life in capitalist consumer cultures and the problems this type of social organisation creates in terms of psychological distress (McDonald & Wearing, 2013). Psychological distress could therefore be understood at the conceptual level by the theorisation of a more reflexive-self that is able to challenge, in creative ways, the familiar modes of thought and practice that modern society is built on, and which create feelings of alienation. It would also emphasise the fundamental conditions of existence, as well as those conditions that characterise contemporary Western society and culture such as rationality, governmentality, technology, multiculturalism, pluralism, and consumerism. Humanistic psychology has been most influential in the area of counselling and psychotherapy, it is therefore important that a reconceptualised self continue to provide a firm foundation for this practice, thus the emphasis on alienation and the fundamental conditions of existence. This fits with Heidegger's own hope that his work would one day benefit as many people as possible, especially people in need of help (Boss, 2001, p. xvii).

In responding to alienation, humanistic psychology would emphasise a personal authenticity accounted for in Heidegger's maxim that existence precedes essence which non-optionally requires the individual to define themselves. Existence requires constant choice which is the primary means through which the process of individuation occurs, the appropriation of one's possibilities, and the primary mode for overcoming alienation (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 266). It is here that Maslow and Rogers' conception of transcendence expressed in a conception of the self as a process of becoming (in each moment we are choosing and renewing the direction of *our life) is retained in our reconceptualisation. This process of becoming would be viewed more as a capacity or a potentiality, than a pre-determined tendency as conceived by Maslow and Rogers.

Maslow and Rogers have been criticised by sociocultural theorists, many of whom draw on Foucault's work. As previously outlined sociocultural theorists have linked Maslow and Rogers concepts of the self to technologies designed to govern human beings in capitalist consumer cultures (e.g. Brinkman, 2008; Carrette, 2003). However, it is important to keep in mind that while Foucault once disavowed the potential for human transcendence, he fell back into offering concepts of transcendence (his aesthetics of existence) later in his career as a solution to his over-determined construction of subjectivity (Huijer, 1999).

Re-casting Maslow and Rogers' earlier concept of an actual-sell; more in line with Heidegger's existential being constituted by historical, social, cultural, political, and economic forces, would inoculate humanistic psychology against its various detractors, who argue that its conceptualisation of the self represents a form of essentialism (Cosgrove, 2007; Geller, 1982, Neher, 1991) and/or political expediency (Buss, 1979; Brinkman, 2008; Carrette, 2003; Malone, 2007; Shaw & Colimore, 1988). By disciplining the self to history and language, the self is not only conceived of as a conscious process of becoming, it also comes to reflect the on-going changes in societal conditions. This historically and socioculturally constituted self would provide a much more powerful set of conceptual tools from which humanistic psychology can continue to critique mainstream approaches to psychology. This is an important capacity of the movement that needs to be retained and can be strengthened in this way. Our reconceptualisation would also retain its commitment to an authentic-self in its capacity to actualise life projects of the individual's choosing by relying on discursive resources that are the stock of paradigmatic stories that circulate in our culture. That meaning would be derived from these stories as well as one's own past and present experiences from which a coherent life-story could be fashioned (Guignon, 2004, p. 131).

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